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2 abstract
Based on a heterogeneous firm set-up, we model firms’ access to the internal ca-
pital market, bank finance as well as bond finance and investigate how firms’ 
adjustment among multiple sources of finance affects their performance in foreign 
direct investment and aggregate industry productivity. We find that when facing a 
bank credit shock (e.g. tighter bank lending), firms with different productivities 
react differently. Less productive firms exit from the foreign market due to a lack 
of funds while the more productive resort to bond finance to sustain their multina-
tional status. The increased demand for bond finance as compensation for decrea-
sed bank finance by the surviving multinationals exacerbates the competition in 
the bond market and bids up the bond return rate, which triggers a Melitz-type 
selection effect through the bond market and brings aggregate industry gains. 
However, the divestment of those failing FDI firms and the consequently reduced 
bond financing demand mitigate this effect. 
Keywords:  bond  market,  heterogeneous  firm,  productivity,  intensive  margin,   
extensive margin, FDI
1 introduction
An emerging body of literature documents the impact of financial development on 
the facilitation of firm internationalization. While its role in providing a larger 
scale of external finance and relaxing firms’ financial constraints is widely accep-
ted, it is not clear whether the diversification of financial channels and access to 
alternative finance accompanied by financial development also play a role. Atten-
tion was drawn to the significance of multiple sources of financing by Alan Green-
span after the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis (Greenspan, 2000). He argued that 
the development of alternative forms of financing helped to fill the funding gap 
and stabilize business financing, which is especially important when either banks 
or capital markets freeze up in a crisis. Following this argument and motivated by 
the credit crunch and simultaneous decline in foreign direct investment (hence-
forth FDI) in the recent financial crisis, we address the question of whether the 
availability of alternative financing sources could help reduce the size of the col-
lapse and influence welfare. 
Multinational firms have better access to multiple sources of finance than their 
domestically oriented peers. Firstly, multinational firms are usually large and pro-
ductive ones (Helpman et al., 2004; Mayer and Ottaviano, 2007). Thus, they have 
a better chance of accessing market finance other than bank borrowing (Cantillo 
and Wright, 2000). Moreover, some firms can gain additional financial support 
from business partners or from the government in the form of trade credit or spe-
cial policy loans. Secondly, multinational firms have access to finance from diffe-
rent locations. They can obtain finance from their parent country, raise funds from 
their host country locally or in some cases explore lower-cost finance on a world-
wide basis (Antras et al., 2009; Marin and Schnitzer, 2006). Meanwhile, the inter-l
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3 nal capital market among the parent company and its foreign affiliates plays an 
important role for multinational firms. The allocation of funds through the internal 
capital market extensively substitutes for external financing when the latter is co-
stly (Desai et al., 2004). Finally, firms tend to keep a precautionary fund reserve to 
cope with potential risks and uncertainty (Bates et al., 2009; Riddick and Whited, 
2009), which is particularly the case for multinational firms, considering the extra 
cost and higher risk in foreign operations. 
Basing on a heterogeneous firm set-up, we model firms’ access to the internal ca-
pital market, bank finance as well as bond finance and investigate how firms’ 
adjustment among multiple sources of finance affects their performance in foreign 
direct investment and aggregate industry productivity. We find that given exoge-
nous contraction in the supply of bank finance, firms with different productivities 
react differently. Some less productive firms exit from the foreign market due to 
less access to bank finance and the high and unaffordable cost of bond finance as 
a result of tougher competition in the bond market. In comparison, some relatively 
more productive firms can resort to bond finance as compensation for decreased 
bank finance to sustain their multinational status. The increased demand for bond 
finance as a substitute for bank finance by the surviving multinationals exacerba-
tes the competition in the bond market and bids up the bond return rate, which 
triggers a Melitz-type selection effect through the bond market and brings aggre-
gate industry gains. However, the divestment of those failing FDI firms and thus 
reduced bond financing demand mitigate this effect. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold. Firstly, our paper complements the 
quickly growing literature on credit constraint and firm internationalization firstly 
by proposing the impact of alternative financing and differentiating firm responses 
to the worsening financial condition. Manova (2007) introduces credit constraint 
into Melitz’s (2003) research and argues that credit constraint restricts firms’ par-
ticipation and performance in cross-border activity. Arndt et al. (2009), Berman 
and Hericourt (2008), Buch et al. (2009), Li and Yu (2009) and Muuls (2008) 
provide supportive evidence for this argument using firm-level data from different 
countries. We reproduce this result that bad credit conditions impede firms from 
engaging in FDI. Furthermore, we show that this effect could be mitigated with 
the existence of alternative financing and could vary across firms with different 
productivities. Compensation from bond finance and the reallocation of the avai-
lable funds stabilize firm financing and facilitate FDI. However, only the most 
productive firms are able to take advantage of multiple sources of finance in 
smoothing foreign investment. 
Secondly, our paper contributes to work on financial systems by analyzing the 
complementary and substitution effect of bank finance and bond finance. Datta et 
al. (1999) and Diamond (1991) document the complementary nature of bank fi-
nance to bond finance by monitoring. Davis and Mayer (1991) show that the bank l
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4 and bond markets can be alternatives to each other but they are not perfect substi-
tutes. Saidenberg and Strahan (1999) focus on the role of bank finance in provi-
ding a back-up source and liquidity insurance for bond finance against market 
shocks. The complementary and substitution effects coexist in our model, which 
varies across firms. Although the substitution of multiple source of finance could 
reduce the sensitivity of foreign investment to adverse shocks, only a small frac-
tion of more productive firms benefit from it. The complementary effect of bond 
finance on bank finance for those less productive firms implies that bond finance 
cannot fully substitute for bank finance when the banking sector faces a crisis. In 
our model, it is the higher cost of bond finance over bank finance that hinders less 
productive firms from employing alternative financing, thus leading to the limited 
substitutability of bond for bank finance. In reality, the higher cost of bond finance 
could be the fixed cost of accessing the bond market, or a higher marginal cost for 
lower-quality firms due to their lower credit rating and higher probability of de-
fault. Our result suggests the significance of reducing the cost of bond finance and 
developing multiple financing sources to satisfy the financing demand of various 
firms, especially of lower-quality firms.
 
Thirdly,  we  propose  FDI-induced  aggregate  productivity  gains  for  the  parent 
country through the selection effect in the capital market. Although the question 
of whether FDI benefits its host country in productivity through technology spil-
lover to domestic firms is widely discussed (Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Bitzer 
and Görg, 2005; Haskel et al., 2002; Javorcik, 2004; Keller and Yeaple, 2003), the 
impact of FDI on the parent country is rarely considered. In contrast to Pottelsber-
ghel and Lichtenberg (2001), who present evidence that a country gains from ou-
tward FDI through technology sourcing, we show that FDI could bring aggregate 
productivity gains for the parent country through the reallocation of financial re-
sources towards more productive firms. The tougher competition in the bond 
market induced by large FDI financing demand selects the least productive firms 
out of production and enhances aggregate productivity. However, this effect is 
dampened due to firms’ adjustment among multiple sources of finance. 
This paper is organized as follows: section two starts with the model in a closed 
economy as a benchmark case. After that, we introduce multiple sources of fina-
nce in an open economy setting, allowing firms to go abroad where the interaction 
of bank finance and bond finance and its impact on the margins of FDI are investi-
gated. Section three characterizes the general equilibrium and discusses the aggre-
gate outcome on industry productivity. Section four concludes.
2 model
Consider a world with two countries. We call one country the home (domestic) 
country and the other the host (foreign) country of FDI. There is a continuum of 
firms, indexed by i, producing differentiated varieties in each country.l
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5 Firm i is born with initial internal fund Ni, which is a random number from a com-
mon distribution G(Ni). After paying an entry cost of fe, the firm draws productivi-
ty ji from a common distribution g(j) (Melitz, 2003). With the knowledge of its 
own productivity, the firm makes the investing decision among three potential 
options: (1) purchasing corporate bonds Bi; (2) investing in domestic production, 
i.e. producing and selling a distinct product w in the home country, the output 
being denoted by qiD; (3) engaging in FDI, i.e. producing and selling w in the host 
country, the output being denoted by qiF. Note that the subscript D denotes varia-
bles for domestic production whereas F denotes those for foreign production; the-
se apply to the whole paper.
There is a perfect bond market in the economy in which firms can either buy or 
issue bonds, Bi being positive or negative accordingly. If there is a very low pro-
ductivity draw, producing is not as profitable as buying bonds. The firm therefore 
invests all its internal funds in bond holdings to achieve a safe return. If there is a 
high productivity draw on the contrary, the firm will produce. If its internal fund 
is not enough to pay the production costs, the firm will raise the working capital 
by issuing corporate bonds through bond markets. 
There is no fixed cost involved in investment in the bond market. In contrast, if the 
firm engages in production, regardless of whether it is domestic production or 
FDI, it must pay a fixed overhead cost f to set up the factory. In addition, there is 
an extra fixed cost CF for FDI. f and CF are measured in labor units.
2.1 closed economy
This subsection provides the closed economy case as a benchmark in which firms 
only serve the domestic market and obtain external finance merely by issuing 
corporate bonds.
2.1.1 Demand
The utility function of a representative consumer is 
 
1 1
U q d
H
H H
H
Z
Z Z
 
:
ª º
 « »
¬ ¼ ³
where the set W represents the mass of available varieties and e denotes the elasti-
city of substitution between any two varieties. Defining the aggregate good QºU 
with the aggregate price
 
1
1 1 P p d
H H
Z
Z Z
 
:
ª º  « » ¬ ¼ ³
and solving the expenditure minimization problem of the consumer, we have the 
demand function for every variety w.l
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   
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q Q
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H
Z
Z
§ ·
 ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸
© ¹  
(1)
2.1.2 Production
Each firm i produces a distinct variety w and its output for the domestic market is 
denoted as qiD. Labor is the only input. Define the cost function for producing qiD 
as: 
 
iD
iD
i
q
l f M  
 
(2)
where f>0 is the fixed cost for production, which is the same for any single firm. 
ji is the firm-specific productivity. The domestic nominal wage is denoted as wD. 
Assume that labor must be prepaid.
2.1.3 bond market
Assume that the bond market is perfect in the sense that it is competitive and the-
re is no information asymmetry, and the equilibrium bond rate is r. Firms can in-
vest their internal funds in buying a bond and achieve a return rate of 1+r. In 
comparison, firms whose domestic production is confined by limited internal funds 
can also issue bonds at the rate of 1+r. In the general equilibrium setting, the bond 
return rate r is determined by the condition that there is no aggregate net demand 
for bonds. For a single firm, however, r is given. 
2.1.4 firms’ optimal decision
In a closed economy, firm i allocates its own internal fund between bond holding 
Bi and domestic production qiD (if it produces) and maximizes the total profit from 
the investment portfolio. Firm i solves
,
max
iD i p B
iD iD iD D iD i p q w l rB S   
s.t. D iD i i e w l B N f  d  ; (1); (2)
where piD is the product price in the home country. We have:
 
  1
1
D
iD
i
w
p r
H
H M
 
  
(3)
    1
iD
D
q Q
w r
H
H
ª º
 « »
 « » ¬ ¼
  1 iP H M 
 
(4)
 
   
 
1 1
1
iD i
D
P
l Q f
w r
H
H H
M
H
 ª º 
« »
 « » ¬ ¼  
(5)
Bond holdings Bi can be calculated from the budget constraint. l
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(6)
Proposition 1 (composition of pricing under limited internal funds): Both the 
financing cost (bond rate r) and the labor cost (wage rate wD and firm-specific 
productivity ji  ) compose the product price. Other things being equal, the higher 
r, higher wD or lower ji, the higher the product price and the lower the output. 
In our setting, the derived price piD consists of three parts: labor cost wD/ji, markup 
e/(e-1) and an additional part 1+r, where 1+r reflects the extra external financing 
cost. If a firm does not have sufficient internal funds for production, it issues a bond 
with a cost of 1+r to raise working capital. Therefore, the limited internal fund 
results in a higher price and lower output. Note that to focus the discussion on 
productivity in this paper, we do not model firm heterogeneity in terms of internal 
fund N. The effect of N on firm financing and production works through aggrega-
tion. If all the firms have more internal funds (N increases), they will issue fewer 
(or hold more) bonds, hence the bond demand increases relative to the supply and 
the bond return rate r declines. Other things being equal, the decreased financing 
cost results in a lower price and the supply of each variety will increase.
2.1.5 cutoff productivity for domestic production
According to Melitz (2003), a firm’s profit from domestic production depends on 
its productivity. Less productive firms earn less profit from production and thus 
have less incentive to produce. Therefore, only those firms with productivities 
above a certain threshold will produce. What differs in our set-up is that we intro-
duce a perfect bond market where firms can purchase bonds to obtain a safe re-
turn. Firms compare the profits from production and those from investing all their 
internal funds in purchasing bonds and decide to produce if and only if the former 
is greater than the latter; therefore, the cutoff productivity for domestic production 
j*
iD is determined by equation (7) below:
    iD iD D iD i i e p q w l rB r N f       (7)
Using (3), (4), (5) and the binding budget constraint, we have
 
   
 
1
1
* 1 1
1
D
iD
f w r
Q P
H H H H
M
H
 ­ ½ ª º   ° °  « » ® ¾
 « » ° ° ¬ ¼ ¯ ¿  
(8)
Proposition 2 (productivity cutoff for domestic production): The productivity 
cutoff for domestic production j*iD is higher with a higher fixed production cost f, 
higher labor wage wD or higher financing cost r.l
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8 f and wD measure the real cost and r measures the financial cost of production. 
Intuitively, the above increasing relationship means a higher cost (either a real or 
financial cost), which requires higher productivity for firms to engage in produc-
tion. The shape of the increasing relationship depends on ε. For example, when ε 
is less than 2, the cutoff productivity is convex in f, while when ε is larger than 2, 
it is concave in f. As for the impact of the firm’s internal fund, it only works through 
a bond market in aggregation. As we discussed in proposition 1, firms’ bond hol-
ding increases with their internal funds. More aggregate internal funds could pull 
down the bond rate and result in a lower cutoff productivity. However, in partial 
equilibrium, the bond rate is exogenous for a single firm. Therefore, the internal 
fund is not directly related to the firm-level cutoff productivity. 
2.2 open economy
In this subsection, we consider the case of an open economy in the sense that firms 
are interested in producing domestically as well as expanding production to a fo-
reign country by means of FDI. Meanwhile, we introduce going-abroad-oriented 
bank credit as alternative financing and reconsider the above firm’s investment 
portfolio decision. The cutoff productivity for a firm to become a multinational is 
also derived. Moreover, the interaction of borrowing from a bank and issuing cor-
porate bonds and the overall effect of multiple sources of finance are discussed. 
2.2.1 Demand
For simplicity and without loss of generality, we assume the aggregate price index 
and aggregate goods index in the host country are the same as those in the home 
country, and are denoted again as P and Q, respectively. We further impose the 
assumption that when the economy shifts from autarky to openness, P and Q will 
not change. In other words, the new varieties coming in as the result of openness 
will not affect the aggregate indices. The demand function for each variety in the 
host country is given by:
 
iF
iF
P
q Q
p
H
§ ·
 ¨ ¸
© ¹  
(9)
2.2.2 Production
Assume firm i’s productivity spills over to its foreign affiliate and it produces in 
the foreign country with the same productivity as in the home country while it has 
to shoulder an extra fixed cost CF to carry out FDI. This foreign expansion-indu-
ced fixed cost includes the expenses for building up foreign affiliates and distribu-
tion channels, collecting information about the foreign market and foreign regula-
tions, etc. Regardless of the form of such a cost, it is independent of the firm’s 
output and must be paid before the firm’s revenue in the foreign market is fulfilled. 
This cost CF is assumed to be uncertain for the firm at the moment when a firm 
arranges its investment portfolio. The distribution of CF is common knowledge l
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9 and the FDI decision is made based on the firm’s expectation for CF . CF is revea-
led when the firm sets foot on the foreign land. FDI is successful (hence FDI 
profit is received) only if CF is fully covered.
In an open economy, the domestic production function is the same as equation (2), 
whereas the production function for FDI is given as:
 
iF
iF F
i
q
l f C
M
  
 
(10)
where qiF and liF are respectively output and labor input in the foreign country. 
Here assume that the extra fixed cost CF follows a concave distribution f(CF) with 
support [0, ¥]. The f(CF) has the cumulative distribution F(CF). 
2.2.3   Going-abroad-oriented loans and the probability of foreign direct 
investment success
To cover CF, the firm can obtain finance from banks. Assume that a going-abroad-
oriented bank loan is available for all FDI firms. Such loans aim to release firms’ 
financial constraints due to the substantial upfront costs of FDI and are therefore 
assumed to be used only to shoulder CF.1 Collateral is required by banks. Firm i 
pledges a fraction t,t Î(0,1] of the overhead fixed cost f as collateral to obtain a 
bank loan of the amount of mtf, where m is the multiplier over the collateral. Here 
we use μ to measure the availability of external bank credit, which is an indicator 
of country-specific financial development. The higher μ implies better access to 
external credit and better financial development of a country. We further assume 
that borrowing from banks is costless as bankers are competitive and have no 
access to the bond market. 
Moreover, to guarantee the sufficiency of funds to cover CF and thus the success 
of FDI, firms may keep some reserve funds A, together with the bank borrowing 
mtf, to pay the extra fixed cost. A could be a fraction of the internal fund or finan-
ced from the bond market. Therefore, before CF is revealed, the firm has A+mtf 
prepared. Hence, the probability of the FDI’s success is Prob(CF £ A+mtf), which 
is F(A+mtf) and it is endogenized. As we shall see, for FDI firms, the more pro-
ductive the firm is, the larger A is kept and the more likely that the FDI will be 
successful.2
2.2.4 firms’ optimal decision
Firm i maximizes the expected total profit from bond holding, domestic produc-
tion and FDI.
1 By this assumption, we rule out the case of firms using this loan to pay for domestic production so that we 
can obtain results in an open economy that are comparable to those in a closed economy and focus on the 
effect of the bank loan on firms’ financing strategy and FDI decisions.
2 We try to model the reality that productive multinational firms issue corporate bonds to raise working capital 
for FDI since the profits from FDI are sufficiently large to cover the financing cost. l
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10
i i iF iD B A p p , , ,
max       [ ] i iD iD D iD iF iF F iF i i E E p q w l p q w l F A f rB S PW      
s.t.   D iD F iF F i i i e w l w l C A B N f     d  ; (1); (2); (9); (10)
Note that the profit from FDI is multiplied by the probability of its success. Also 
note that in the budget constraint, CF is covered by A and mtf. Denoting the ex-
pected value of CF as C, we have:
 
  1
1
D
iD
i
w
p r
H
H M
 
  
(11)
 
   
1
1
F
iF
i i
w r
p
F A f
H
H MPW
§ ·
  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸
© ¹ 
(12)
    i i e D iD F iF i B N f w l w l C A         (13)
and Ai is determined by:
         iF iF F iF i p q w l f f A r PW   (14)
Equations (11)–(14) characterize the optimal choices of an FDI firm. We can com-
pare the prices in the home country and the host country by comparing (11) and 
(12), noticing that F(A+mtf)£1.
The price for the domestic market has the same expression as that in the closed 
economy benchmark (equation (3) in section 2.1.4), which means that firms do 
not change their pricing strategy for the home market when they start foreign bu-
siness. Nevertheless, the actual value of the domestic price may be different. 
When the economy shifts from autarky to openness, firms of high productivity 
adjust their investment portfolios: they purchase fewer bonds (or issue more bonds) 
and allocate funds to FDI. The adjustment, as will be discussed in aggregation in 
section 3, induces tougher competition in the bond market and drives the bond 
return rate up. Hence, the actual price in the home market under an open economy 
setting will be higher than in a closed economy, although they share the same 
mathematical expression.
An implicit solution of firm i’s choice of A is given by equation (14). The simula-
tion results are provided in appendix A (where propositions 3 to 6 are simulated). 
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3 (reserve fund for fDI): The reserve fund for FDI Ai is higher with 
higher productivity ji, lower credit access m, lower production fixed cost f or 
lower bond financing cost r. l
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11 The relationship between A and m suggests a firm’s substitution in multiple sour-
ces of finance. When bank credit is tighter, a firm increases Ai as the alternative 
source to cover CF, so that it can maintain FDI. This finding supplements the exi-
sting literature in which firms are left helpless and exit production when bank 
credit is tight (Buch et al., 2009; Manova, 2007). In our model, however, firms can 
resort to alternative finance and keep production unaffected. 
Note that borrowing from a bank has no cost but Ai has a cost of (1+r), because Ai is 
raised either from internal funds or from the bond market. If the bond return rate is 
higher, it is more attractive to buy bonds than to produce, hence the firm will cut Ai. 
As for the negative role of fixed cost f in A, it works in two ways. On one hand, f 
is a real cost of FDI. The higher the cost is, the less incentive there is for firms to 
undertake FDI, and hence the smaller the reserve fund firms keep for FDI projects. 
On the other hand, f could be used as collateral: firms can obtain greater bank 
loans against a larger f, so they could reduce the amount of the reserve fund.
An important finding is that more productive firms keep more reserve funds and 
thus have a higher probability of success in producing abroad. As FDI is more 
profitable with higher productivity, those firms have incentives to guarantee the 
FDI’s success. This result differs from the previous literature, in which the proba-
bility of success or the probability of firms’ default is assumed to be exogenous 
and independent of firm productivity (e.g. Buch et al., 2009; Manova, 2007). In Li 
and Yu (2009), more productive firms have a higher probability of success but 
such a relationship is ex ante given without a micro foundation. In our model, 
however, the probability is firm-specific and firms themselves choose how much 
to “invest” to increase the probability of success.
Proposition 4 (intensive margin of fDI): The more productive a firm is (higher 
ji), the larger is its affiliate sale. The sale is also larger if the wage cost wF is 
lower or the bond financing cost r is lower. If a firm can maintain FDI after a 
credit crunch (decrease in credit multiplier m), it raises working capital from is-
suing bonds and keeps its affiliate sale unaffected.
The first three arguments on ji, wF and r are intuitive and easily verified through 
equation (12). Higher productivity or a lower cost, either the wage cost or the fi-
nancial cost, results in more output and sales. However, the change in bank credit 
availability m triggers firms’ adjustment to their financing strategy and affects   
affiliate sales indirectly. In partial equilibrium, when bank credit suddenly beco-
mes tight, firms raise more funds from the bond market to substitute for bank 
credit in order to keep their working capital. In our model, when m decreases to 
such an extent that there is less borrowing, if a firm can maintain FDI, it will in-
crease A (proposition 3) to keep the probability of the FDI’s success. Therefore, 
3 We will discuss the condition for firms to maintain FDI in section 2.2.5. l
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12 according to equation (12), as long as the bond return rate does not change in 
partial equilibrium, the affiliate sale qiF will not be affected. This result is consi-
stent with the evidence that during the recent financial crisis, a non-negligible 
fraction of firms reallocated more funds to finance working capital and their sales 
remain unchanged or even expand, especially in domestic-oriented or non-trada-
ble sectors (World Bank Financial Crisis Survey 2010; 2010 Survey on Current 
Conditions and Intention of Outbound Investment by Chinese Enterprises).
2.2.5 cutoff productivity for foreign direct investment
Following the argument in section 2.1.5, the cutoff productivity for FDI is derived 
by equation (15), the LHS of which is the profit when the firm engages in domestic 
production as well as FDI while the RHS is the profit when the firm merely serves 
the domestic market. The firm will expand production to the foreign country if and 
only if its total profit is higher than that from only serving the domestic market. 
            iD iD D iD iF iF F iF iF iD iD D iD iD p q w l p q w l F A f rB p q w l rB PW   (15)
where BiF comes from (13) and BiD comes from (6). Then we derive the expression 
of cutoff productivity for FDI:
 
   
   
1
1
* 1 1 / /
1
1
F F
iF
f w r F FC rA w
Q P F r f
H H H H
M
H
 ­ ½ ª º § ·    ° °   ¨ ¸ « » ® ¾ ¨ ¸   « » ° ° ¬ ¼ © ¹ ¯ ¿   (16)
where F denotes F(A+mtf).
Proposition 5 (extensive margin of fDI): The productivity cutoff for FDI j*
iF is 
lower when firms have better access to credit (higher credit multiplier m), lower 
bond financing cost r, lower production fixed cost f or C, and lower labor wage wF . 
The expected profit of undertaking FDI is larger with a higher m. 
With the support of better availability of bank credit, more firms are able to go 
abroad. Meanwhile, the induced higher expected profits make FDI more attractive 
to firms. This result implies better credit conditions as a result of the financial 
development in a country, which plays a positive role in facilitating firm interna-
tionalization. On the contrary, various costs, such as the labor wage, overhead cost 
and financial cost, impede firms going abroad.
Proposition 6 (cutoff gap): The gap between the productivity cutoff for FDI and 
the cutoff for domestic production (j*
iF – j*
iD ) is lower facing lower bond rate r, 
larger credit multiplier m and lower expected fixed cost C.l
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13 Comparing equation (16) with equation (8), and knowing that F(A+mtf)£1, we 
immediately conclude that j*
iF>j*
iD. Due to the existence of extra fixed costs, 
firms require higher productivity to attain positive profits from FDI. The two cu-
toffs are equal if and only if C=0. In this case, the probability of a successful FDI 
is 1 and firms will not keep any A as it is not necessary and A is costly. Proposition 
6 states that a better credit condition (higher m) or lower bond financing cost (lower 
r) can reduce the productivity requirement for FDI and promote domestic firms’ 
growth into multinationals. Note that when facing a lower bond return rate r, both 
cutoffs decrease, while that for FDI declines faster, indicating the higher sensiti-
vity of FDI to financing conditions compared with domestic production.
2.2.6 Complementarity and substitution of multiple sources of finance
FDI firms have access to two external sources of finance, i.e. borrowing from banks 
and issuing corporate bonds. When facing a bank credit shock, firms adjust their 
financing strategy and fund allocation among investment projects but firms with 
different productivities react differently. Take a bad credit shock as an example. 
When bank credit suddenly becomes tight, i.e. m suddenly decreases, j*
iF increa-
ses (proposition 5) and some relatively less productive FDI firms are forced to exit 
from FDI. As a result of withdrawing capital from FDI, these firms issue fewer 
bonds. In this case, deteriorative bank credit results in shrinking bond issuance, 
which we call the complementary effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing.
In contrast, however, those firms that are productive enough to maintain FDI un-
der a worse credit condition issue more bonds as a substitution for reduced bank 
credit and keep the working capital for foreign production unchanged, which we 
call the substitution effect of bond issuing and bank borrowing. Because of the 
possibility of issuing bonds as an alternative form of finance, firms do not neces-
sarily experience production contraction when facing credit tightness, which im-
plies the significance of multiple sources of finance in smoothing investment. 
Figure 1 intuitively depicts the change in A with decreased m (from m to m ’) and the 
differentiation of firms in financing. As we mentioned above, only those firms 
with productivities that are higher than the cutoff productivity for FDI keep reser-
ve fund A. The more productive the firm is, the more A it raises (proposition 3). 
Therefore, A is 0 for firms with productivities lower than j*
iF (m), and A jumps to 
positive at the cutoff value j*
iF (m) and keeps increasing with j after that. 
Facing a bank credit shock (m decreases to m ’), the cutoff of carrying out FDI in-
creases from j*
iF (m) to j*
iF (m ’). The firms with productivities in between exit 
from FDI and hence do not reserve A any longer, while those firms with producti-
vity higher than j*
iF (m ’) maintain FDI and raise more A from issuing bonds. As the 
adjustment of A responding to the alteration of the bank credit condition is throu-
gh bond finance, figure 1 shows the complementary and substitution effect of 
bond finance and bank finance. l
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3 aggregation 
3.1 characterization of equilibrium in an open economy
In an open economy, stationary general equilibrium is characterized as follows: 
(1) there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for domestic production j*
D, which is 
determined by equalizing the profit from purely holding bonds and that from pro-
ducing domestically; (2) there is an aggregate cutoff productivity for FDI j*
F, 
which is determined by comparing the total profit from engaging in domestic pro-
duction and FDI with that from merely domestic production; (3) a mass M of in-
cumbent firms is partitioned into three groups in terms of productivity. Firms with 
productivity higher than j*
F  produce domestically as well as abroad. Firms with 
productivity lower than j*
D do not produce but invest in purchasing bonds. Firms 
with productivity in between produce and serve the domestic market; (4) a firm’s 
entry decision is made by equalizing the present value of the expected average 
profit flows  ǉǉ  of all types of firms and the sunk cost for entry fe; (5) in each period, 
a mass Me of new entrants replaces the mass of M of incumbent firms that are hit 
by a bad shock with the probability of  and exit; (6) product markets clear such 
that the consumers’ demand is met by the firms’ supply; (7) the labor market clears 
to determine the wage w (we assume the inelastic supply of labor L); (8) the bond 
market clears in the sense that there is no aggregate net demand for bonds, where 
the bond rate r is determined; (9) the resource constraint is satisfied such that the 
total income equals the total expenditure. The derivation of the general equili-
brium is given in appendix B.
3.2   aggregate outcome of the complementary effect and 
substitution effect 
As we discussed above, when an adverse shock on bank credit occurs, the comple-
mentary effect implies that FDI divestment and the purchase of more bonds, whe-
figure 1 
Complementary effect and substitution effect
A
Complementary: failing
firms do not hold A
Substitution: surviving
firms holds more A
0
μ’< μ
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15 reas the substitution effect means that firms issue more bonds to finance FDI. In 
general equilibrium, the complementary effect and substitution effect influence 
the demand and supply in the bond market and thus the bond rate oppositely. The 
overall outcome is a result of the relative scale of the two effects, which further 
relies on the distribution of firm productivity and the severity of shocks on bank 
credit. In a country where the firm distribution skews towards high productivity, 
more firms will sustain FDI and the substitution effect will be dominant. As a re-
sult, the bond rate will increase. The effect of shocks is more complicated. On one 
hand, when facing a more severe adverse shock, more firms exit from FDI and 
transfer capital to purchasing bonds. On the other hand, the survivors in FDI will 
issue more bonds to compensate for the reduced bank finance. Consequently, both 
the complementary effect and the substitution effect are stronger and the overall 
effect is ambiguous. 
3.3   selection effect in the bond market and aggregate  
industry productivity
When an economy opens, those productive firms that go abroad will issue more 
bonds from the parent country to finance foreign production. The increased supply 
in the bond market will bid up the bond return rate and thus increase the financing 
cost for all the producing firms, either FDI or non-FDI firms. Facing a higher fi-
nancing cost, the least productive producing firms are forced to exit from produc-
tion and switch to being purely bond holders. Thus, the aggregate productivity of 
the producing firms increases. Therefore, outward FDI triggers the selection effect 
through the bond market and brings aggregate industry productivity gains for the 
parent country.
As previously discussed in section 3.2, a shock to the bank credit supply can also 
influence the bond return rate and hence further the aggregate productivity gains. 
However, whether the change in bank credit conditions will intensify or weaken 
such gains depends on the relative importance of the above complementary effect 
and substitution effect. As a response to an adverse shock to bank finance, the ri-
sing bond rate as a result of the substitution effect will shuffle the deck and wash 
out less productive firms. However, the existence of the complementary effect 
pulls down the bond rate and mitigates this selection. 
4 conclusion 
This paper introduces the internal fund, bank finance and bond finance into a he-
terogeneous firm set-up and analyzes firms’ adjustment among multiple sources of 
finance and its impact on the performance of FDI and aggregate industry produc-
tivity. We show that with access to the bond market as an alternative source of fi-
nancing, firms suffering from bank lending tightness could stabilize their finan-
cing and maintain FDI. However, only a proportion of more productive firms be-
nefit from the substitution of bond finance for bank finance. In comparison, the 
less efficient firms could not afford the higher cost of bond finance due to the in-l
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16 creased competition in the bond market, and thus exit from production. Therefore, 
the rising bond rate induces the reallocation of financial resources from less effi-
cient firms towards more efficient ones and thus increases the aggregate industry 
productivity of the producing firms. Nevertheless, the decreased financing de-
mand of divesting firms helps to pull down the bond rate and thus weakens the 
above effect.
Our results suggest the significance of the diversification of financial channels and 
the availability of alternative financing in smoothing foreign investment, which is 
particularly important for low-quality firms. Moreover, the selection through the 
bond market implies the role of the capital market in reshuffling firms, which also 
proposes a mechanism of FDI-induced welfare for parent countries. 
To focus on the role of alternative financing in stabilizing investment, we did not 
discuss the difference between bank finance and bond finance in this paper. Howe-
ver, modeling their differences in restructuring, monitoring and screening will 
help us to understand better the limited substitutability of the two sources of fina-
nce and might generate more fruitful results. Moreover, modeling the financing 
sources of bank sectors and investigating the co-movement of the bank sector and 
the bond market constitute another direction for future research. In addition, rela-
xing the perfect competition assumption for the bond market and introducing a 
firm-specific bond rate are also interesting extensions.l
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17 appendix a
numerical simulations of the propositions
Propositions 1 and 2 are straightforward, so here we only provide the simulation 
results for propositions 3, 4, 5 and 6. 
Distribution of the fixed cost for FDI: Assume CF follows Pareto distribution
 
    Pr 1
k
F
b
F x C x
x
§ ·  d  ¨ ¸
© ¹  
(A.1)
with the support of [b,¥], where b and k are parameters of the distribution. The 
probability density function of CF is therefore given by
 
  1
k k
k
kb k b
f x
x x x

§ ·   ¨ ¸
© ¹  
(A.2)
Denote the mean of CF as c, then   
1
F
kb
c E C
k
 

.
a.1 simulation of proposition 3
The optimal reserve fund A for an FDI firm is given by equation (14)
       iF iF F iF i p q w l f A PWf r .
By inserting equations (9), (10), (12), (A.1) and (A.2) into equation (14) we obtain 
equation A.3 for the simulation.
Figures A.1.1–A.1.4 depict the change in A with m, r, f and j, respectively. 
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18 Parameter values
Figure A.1.1:   r = 0.05, ji = 0.5, f = 10, e = 2, wF = 1, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.1.2:   m = 1.4, ji = 0.5, f = 10, e = 2, wF = 1, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.1.3.:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, ji = 0.5, e = 2, wF = 1, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.1.4:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, f = 10, e = 2, wF = 1, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
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a.2 simulation of proposition 4
We derive the solution for qiF  (A.4) by inserting equation (12) and the distribution 
of CF into equation (9), where variable A is determined by equation (A.3). 
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Fig. A.1.1 Fig. A.1.2
Fig. A.1.3 Fig. A.1.4l
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19 Figures A.2.1–A.2.4 show the change in qiF with r, wF, j and m, respectively.
Parameter values
Figure A.2.1:   m = 1.4, ji = 0.5, wF = 1, e = 2, f = 10, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.2.2:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, ji = 0.5, e = 2, f = 10, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5,   
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.2.3:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, wF = 1, e = 2, f = 10, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.2.4:   r = 0.05, ji = 0.5, wF = 1, e = 2, f = 10, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
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a.3 simulation of proposition 5
Inserting  1
k
b
F
PW
§ ·
 ¨ ¸  © ¹ A f  
into equation (16), we obtain equation (A.5) for 
simulation relating to j*
iF. Variable A in equation (A.5) is determined by equation 
(A.3) in which ji takes the value of j*
iF.l
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(A.5)
The total profit of FDI firms is: 
          i iD iD D iD iF iF F iF i i p q w l p q w l F A f rB S PW           i iD iD D iD iF iF F iF i i p q w l p q w l F A f rB S PW   (A.6)
Inserting the optimal solutions of firms’ profit maximization problem given by 
equations (1), (2), (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13) into (A.6) and rearranging, we 
obtain the final simulation equation for .
 
(A.7)
Variable A in equation (A.7) is determined by equation (A.3).
Figures A.3.1–A.3.4 show the change of j*
iF with m, r, f and wF, respectively. Fi-
gure A.3.5 depicts the increasing relationship of  with m.l
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21 Parameter values
Figure A.3.1:   r = 0.05, f = 10, wF = 1, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.3.2:   m = 1.4, f = 10, wF = 1, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.3.3:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, wF = 1, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.3.4:   r = 0.05, f = 10, m = 1.4, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, 
b = k = 3, c = 4.5
Figure A.3.5:   r = 0.05, f = 10, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, b = k = 3, 
c = 4.5, wD = wF = 1, fe = 10, N = 500
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22 a.4 simulation of proposition 6
2.0
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0.01916
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The simulation equation for j*
iF – j*
iD is derived by equation (A.5) minus equation 
(8).
Figures A.4.1–A.4.3 describe the change in the cutoff gap j*
iF – j*
iD with r, m and 
c, respectively. Note that given k, the relationship of j*
iF – j*
iD and c is indirectly 
represented by the change in j*
iF – j*
iD with b.
Parameter values
Figure A.4.1:   m = 1.4, f = 10, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, b = k = 3, 
c = 4.5, wD = wF = 1
Figure A.4.2:   r = 0.05, f = 10, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, b = k = 3, 
c = 4.5, wD = wF = 1
Figure A.4.3:   r = 0.05, m = 1.4, e = 2, ji = 0.5, P = 10, Q = 10, t = 0.5, k = 3,   
wD = wF = 1
Fig. A.3.5 Fig. A.4.1
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23 appendix b 
sketch of the general equilibrium in an open economy
Following Melitz (2003), we assume that there is an unlimited number of prospec-
tive firms waiting to enter our model. Each firm was born with an initial fund N. 
To enter, they first have to pay entry cost fe with their initial fund to draw their own 
productivities from a common distribution g(j). g(j) is Pareto distribution with 
cumulative density function G(j) and the support of [b,¥] (Helpman et al., 2004). 
Firms with high productivity produce, among which the higher ones also engage 
in FDI, while those with low productivity hold bonds only. All the firms face a 
constant probability  of forced exit in each period. The forced exit firms can pay 
fe to draw new productivity again. 
Denotations of endogenous variables: M number of incumbent firms; Me number 
of new entrants in each period;  ǉǉ  average profit across all types of firms; j*
D cutoff 
productivity for domestic production; j*
F cutoff productivity for FDI; P price in-
dex; Q aggregate goods; w wage; r bond rate.
The steady-state equilibrium is characterized by the following equations.
Zero cutoff profit for domestic production:
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 « » ° ° ¬ ¼ ¯ ¿  
(B.1)
Zero cutoff profit for FDI:
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(B.2)
Expected average profit:
   
(B.3)
where:  D D D D D p q wl rB S     and      F D D D F F F F p q wl p q wl F A f rB S PW      
    F D D D F F F F p q wl p q wl F A f rB S PW      l
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24 free entry condition:   e f
S
G
   (B.4)
Firm entry equals firm exit:   Me = M  (B.5)
labor market clearing condition:
(B.6)
where L is the exogenous total supply of the economy,     
 
1 1
1
D
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l Q f
w r
H
H H
M
H
 ª º 
« »
 « » ¬ ¼
 
and      
 
1 1
1
F
P
l Q f c
r
w
H
H H
M
H

ª º
« »
 « »
« » § · « »  ¨ ¸ ¨ ¸ « » © ¹ ¬ ¼ PW  F A f
.
bond market clearing condition:
 
(B.7)
where  D e D B N f wl     and    F e D F B N f wl w l c A       .
Price index:
(B.8)
Resource constraint:     e e N f M PQ wL       (B.9)
In equation (B.1) – (B.9), 
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and A is an implicit function of j, which is determined by equation (14)
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